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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

25X1A

COUNTRY USSR

SUBJECT Storage and Distribution of Sugar/Lack of
Fortifications and Military Stockpiles in KievPLACE ACQUIRED
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1. Untouchable military reserves of agricultural commodities existed in the eastern USSR but I do not know their location nor other details about them. Grain was not stored in the "sovkhozi" as the peasants were not trusted. Sugar probably was also included in the military reserves. However, it should be remembered that sugar must be replaced with fresh sugar, otherwise it deteriorates, and must be kept at a special temperature. Sugar refining plants stored sugar on the premises and permitted it to be taken only on written orders from Moscow. If sugar was to be exported, the Ministry of Foreign Trade would authorize it. If sugar was to be utilized internally, GLAVSAHAR (Glavnaya Upravleniya Saharni Promishlenosti - Chief Administration of the Sugar Industry) of the Ministry of the Food Industry would approve its use. For example, the Globino Sugar Factory (Globinski Saharni Zavod) produced sugar during the period October-January. During the 1927-1928 season it produced approximately one million "pudi" (one "pud" = about 40 pounds). Storage facilities at the plant had a capacity of approximately 300 thousand "pudi". The amount above that was sent at once to authorized consumers. Most of the sugar in the 1930's was exported, when the USSR was engaged in "dumping" commodities abroad at low prices. Even the plant director received only the normal sugar ration from a workers' cooperative. The monthly ration in the 1930's was only from one and one-half to two pounds. I believe that the great bulk of the sugar in the USSR was stored at the sugar factories. The storage facilities of the plants were required to be empty before the next production period began.
2. The Soviet Army used refined cube sugar, because it was easier to distribute in cube form. The cubes were about four times the size of US sugar cubes. A large, extremely hard sugar loaf was cut into cubes, which were loaded in cotton sacks. Each sack held six "pudov" of granulated sugar; slightly less of cube sugar.

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3. I cannot say that I noticed any significant changes in the sugar industry just prior to World War II which indicated that the economy was being geared for war. Since 1928 the five year plans were in effect a preparation for war. Among many other things, the plans called for increased sugar production. As early as 1925 I was instructed to draw up a secret evacuation plan for the sugar factory at which I worked at that time. Key personnel and vital parts were listed and the place to which the plant was to be evacuated was known. Vital parts were to be taken so that an invader could not utilize the factory. In 1941 the plan was carried out. As in other plants, it was done inefficiently and the factory operated under the Germans. Workers who remained behind, and who had to continue working in order to eat, provided the Germans with sketches of the necessary, missing parts, which were promptly made in local machine shops.
4. No line of fortifications ran through Kiev as of 1941, despite any rumors to the contrary. There was an old, unequipped fortress built by Peter the Great in the Pecherski rayon of the city. It was, of course, useless in modern warfare. However, in about 1940 I was told by persons who had travelled through the area west of Kiev that underground fortifications about 100 or 200 kilometers west of the city had been built and that trees had been planted atop the works. I believe this was exaggerated as there was no Soviet resistance there at the time of the German invasion. Of course, in July 1941, trenches and antitank ditches were dug around Kiev, but these proved to be of no avail. In regard to antiaircraft, only mobile military units were in the city in 1941. Radar was unknown in the USSR in 1941. I believe that there were no stockpiles of war materials in Kiev, as the stockpiles were further east. However, there was probably some accumulation of military equipment in the city as there was a military arsenal in the Pecherski rayon of Kiev. The arsenal produced only military equipment. I have no further information on it, except that I know it did not produce tanks.

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